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ABSTRACT. This paper examines the notion of aesthetic pleasure within the
framework of an aesthetics of value. The topic is introduced in sect. 1,
while sect. 2 presents Moritz Geiger’s distinction between two kinds of
aesthetic pleasure: liking, which enables us to grasp the aesthetic values of
the artwork; and enjoyment, which is understood to be an emotional
response. Sect. 3 reassesses the main tenets of Geiger’s account in the light
of current research. In particular, I provide arguments in favor of Geiger’s
distinction between liking and enjoyment, but I call into question the
claim that liking reveals aesthetic values. In sect. 4, I suggest that liking is
a form of feeling motivated by the cognition of aesthetic value and I
distinguish it from both the grasping of values and emotional responses. I
conclude in sect. 5 by briefy summarizing my main claims. 
KEYWORDS. Aesthetic pleasure; Aesthetic value; Emotion; Enjoyment;
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1. Introduction
As is the case with other aesthetic concepts, including beauty, the
concept of aesthetic pleasure almost vanished from the aesthetic
discourse during the second half of the last century.1 On the one hand,
the signifcance of aesthetic pleasure was challenged by those authors
inspired by Brecht and Adorno’s materialist aesthetics, who
considered that the main function of art is not to please but to move us
to social and moral action.2 On the other hand, the rise of aesthetic
cognitivism after Beardsley and Hospers led to a shifting of attention
toward the cognitive powers of art, relegating the notion of pleasure to
the background.3 In addition, the few contemporary accounts of
aesthetic pleasure that do exist have tended to explain its function in
terms close to emotivist and projectionist views, arguing that aesthetic
pleasure confers value on those objects able to elicit it.4 Against this
backdrop, Gorodeisky has drawn attention to a blind spot in
contemporary research by considering aesthetic pleasure to be
revelatory of aesthetic value. In this paper, my aim is to advance the
debate on aesthetic pleasure in the objectivist direction highlighted by
Gorodeisky. In particular, I will focus on two main questions: What is
the place of aesthetic pleasure within the mind? How is pleasure
connected to values? 
The answers that I will develop in response to these questions take
inspiration from the phenomenological tradition. More precisely, I am
interested in presenting and reassessing Moritz Geiger’s (1880–1937)
account of aesthetic pleasure. Attention will be paid to a distinction
between two kinds of aesthetic pleasure: liking, which enables us to
1 For an analysis of the historical causes of the decline of beauty, which in my view can
also be applied to the parallel loss of interest in the notion of aesthetic pleasure, see
HUEMER AND VENDRELL FERRAN 2019. 
2 BRECHT 1953, 110 and ADORNO 1970, 409.
3 BEARDSLEY 1981 and HOSPERS 1946.
4 See GORODEISKY 2019a, 2 and 2019b. 
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grasp the aesthetic values of the work; and enjoyment, which is an
emotional response toward the grasped values. Geiger’s account is
interesting in the context of current aesthetics for two reasons. First, by
distinguishing between liking and enjoyment, he ofers us a good
starting point to shed light on the nature of liking as an activity of the
mind which is not assimilable to the category of emotion. Second, he
ofers an explanation of how every kind of pleasure relates to aesthetic
value. However, as we will see, Geiger’s claims are not exempt from
controversy. I will subject his claims to scrutiny, examining them in
the light of recent accounts. While I will provide further arguments in
favor of Geiger’s claim that liking is distinct from emotional responses
such as enjoyment, I will also call into question the claim that liking
reveals aesthetic values. Through this framework, I will suggest that
liking is a form of feeling elicited by the cognition of aesthetic value
and I will distinguish it from both the grasping of values and
emotional responses.  
The aim of this paper is twofold. The frst aim is historical: my
intention is to ofer a reading of Geiger’s writing on aesthetic pleasure
which makes his work suitable for a dialogue with contemporary
philosophy. The early stages of phenomenological aesthetics have
been largely neglected and are completely absent in many textbooks
on aesthetics.5 It is high time to reconsider them, to pay tribute to their
insightful contributions, and to demonstrate their value for
contemporary research.6 The second aim is more systematic. I will take
5 Venanzio Raspa has made the same diagnosis in the case of the Aesthetics of the Graz
School (to which authors like Meinong and Witasek belong) (RASPA 2010, 8). For a
discussion of phenomenologists working on aesthetics, see BIEMEL 1995, 337-50. 
6 Geiger’s contributions to the study of empathy and emotional expression as well as his
valuable accounts of the role of consciousness in the emotional experience have attracted
recent attention (see AVERCHI 2015; CRESPO 2015; SALICE 2020; and VENDRELL FERRAN 2019).
However, his contribution to the topic of aesthetic pleasure, which is the focus of this
paper, has not caught the attention of current aestheticians, despite receiving laudatory
remarks such as the following: «Among the older thinkers Kant, and among the more
recent ones Moritz Geiger, each dedicated penetrating inquires to it, and the results they
obtained belong to the best that has been achieved in the realm of aesthetics»
(HARTMANN 2014, 74). In a recent paper, Summa approaches briefy the notion of
aesthetic enjoyment in SUMMA (2020).
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Geiger as a starting point to advance the debate on aesthetic pleasure,
shedding light on its relation to other afective mental phenomena at
work during the aesthetic experience and examining its specifc
connection with aesthetic value.  
The paper is structured as follows. Sect. 2 presents and discusses
Moritz Geiger’s distinction between two kinds of aesthetic pleasure.
Sect. 3 reassesses the main tenets of Geiger’s account in the light of
current research. In sect. 4, I present my view that liking is a form of
feeling. I conclude in sect. 5 by briefy summarizing the main claims.
2. Geiger on Aesthetic Pleasure 
2.1 The Distinction Between Liking (Gefallen) and Enjoyment (Genuss)
Geiger’s aesthetics is, as he used to put it, an “aesthetics of value”
(Wertästhetik).7 He coined this expression to contrast his aesthetics
from the more dominant “aesthetics of efect” (Wirkungsästhetik),
which was concerned mainly with the psychological efects of
artworks (i.e., with sensations, emotions, and moods), rather than their
artistic values.8 Geiger’s main aim in aesthetics was to reconcile the
7 He also refers explicitly to aesthetics as “value science” (GEIGER 1986, 61).
8 In the course of his critique of an aesthetics focused exclusively on the psychological
efects of the artwork, Geiger develops an insightful and detailed critique of
sentimentalism in the arts, i.e., a critique of the attitude in which we engage with an
artwork with the sole aim of experiencing emotions. Geiger elaborates a distinction
between two attitudes of aesthetic engagement: “inner concentration”
(Innenkonzentration), which focuses on the emotions that the artwork elicits in us, and
“outer concentration” (Aussenkonzentration), which is concerned with the values of the
work. Outer concentration is necessary for the appreciation of the artwork. However, not
all types of inner concentration are reproachable. He distinguishes between inner
concentration in the emotion (Innenkonzentration in Stimmungen), which consists in
attending the experience of the emotion dissolving the boundaries between the
experiencing self and the experienced emotion, and inner concentration toward the
emotion (Innenkonzentration auf Stimmungen) through which we attend to the emotion
experienced but preserve the boundaries between ourselves and the emotion. This
second kind of inner concentration might have an aesthetic function. For a discussion of
Geiger’s critique of sentimentalism, see VENDRELL FERRAN (forthc.).  
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subjectivity of the aesthetic experience with the objectivity of aesthetic
values.9 In this context, he developed the complex account of aesthetic
pleasure in which we can fnd the distinction between liking (Gefallen)
and enjoyment (Genuss) that forms the focus of this paper.10 
For Geiger, aesthetic values are given to us with phenomenological
objectivity. As he observes, this view does not make the value
properties «absolute» because it does not imply that values are
permanent properties of the object, but it does indicate that we
experience aesthetic properties as being objectively present.11
According to Geiger, aesthetic values are immediately grasped
through our liking.12 This liking must be distinguished strictly from
enjoyment, which is described as pure feeling and excitement and
does not contribute to grasping the values of the work. Geiger
observes that his distinction between grasping the values of the work
in liking and enjoying the work has usually gone unnoticed in the
relevant literature, resulting in a confation between both kinds of
aesthetic experience. However, as he remarks, the claims “I like this
picture” (Dieses Bild gefällt mir) and “This picture pleases me” (dieses
Bild bereitet mir Genuss) describe experiences of a diferent nature.13
9 Though Geiger’s aesthetics is phenomenological in nature, it has elements similar to the
aesthetics of the Graz School, which was also developed within the Brentanian tradition
of value objectivism. A feature that makes his account unique is his frequent
employment of methods close to those used in experimental psychology. Geiger was
initially trained under the auspices of Wundt before turning to phenomenology and
becoming one of the main representatives of the Munich phenomenological circle.
10 Thanks to Klaus Berger’s and Wolfhart Henckmann’s eforts, Geiger’s works on
aesthetics were collected in the volume Die Bedeutung der Kunst (1976). This volume
contains most of the writings on aesthetics he published in his lifetime as well as some
manuscripts found in his Nachlass. Parts of this book were translated by Berger into
English and published in the book The Signifcance of Art (GEIGER 1986). For a general
introduction to Geiger’s aesthetics, see BERGER 1976, 8-17; BERGER 1986, ix–xx; and
HENCKMANN 1976, 301-11.
11 For Geiger, each individual fnds beauty before him in the object in which he takes
pleasure, even if diferent people take pleasure in diferent things and beauty depends
on the beholder. 
12 GEIGER 1986, 62. The idea of an immediate grasping of values can already be found in
one of Geiger’s frst texts Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung (GEIGER 1911). 
13 The distinction already appears in one of his early aesthetic writings, entitled Beiträge
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To explain the diference between both experiences, Geiger presents
a series of arguments which I will summarize in the following points:14
2.1.1 Position-Taking
First, according to Geiger, the sentence “I like this picture”
presupposes the adoption of an inner attitude which he describes as a
“yes” to the picture: “The picture is there before me and raises in me
the question of what attitude to adopt toward it. And the answer may
turn out to be positive or negative: I may like or dislike the picture.
This is not an intellectual yea-saying or nay-saying; it is a pre-
intellectual attitude conforming to feeling”.15 By contrast, enjoyment
(Genuss) is an emotional reaction to the work but not a direct “yes” to
it. Enjoyment does not presuppose an act of position-taking toward
the picture. 
2.1.2 Polarity
Second, liking has an opposite: disliking. We can speak of pleasure
and displeasure. By contrast, enjoyment does not have a polar
opposite, as is typical for the emotional reactions as a category.
Enjoyment does not have a negative counterpart, just as fear, anger,
terror and desperation do not have positive counterparts. 
2.1.3 Relation between subject and object
A further diference concerns the relation between the subject and its
object. Pleasure is an active attitude toward its object. The act of
position-taking involved in liking implies a moment of receptivity
toward the object where the subject is actively involved. By contrast,
in enjoyment, the subject is passive in relation to the targeted object, as
is the case for emotional reactions such as terror, fear, etc.
zur Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genusses (Contributions to a Phenomenology of Aesthetic
Enjoyment), GEIGER 1974 [1913], 573. 
14 These arguments appear mainly in one of his posthumously published manuscripts Der
ästhetischer Wert (The Aesthetic Value), translated into English as Pleasure and Enjoyment
(GEIGER 1986). 
15 GEIGER 1986, 62.
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2.1.4 Cognitive function
Fourth, in liking we are open to the value properties of the object: it
constitutes a “yes” to the object’s values or a “no” to its disvalues.
Pleasure is a pleasure “in” the values of the work. According to
Geiger, the value of the artwork is grasped and afirmed in liking,
while its disvalues are grasped and rejected in disliking. By contrast,
enjoyment is enjoyment of the efects upon one’s self. It is a reaction to
an object but there is no grasping of values involved. We can speak of
sexual enjoyment, of enjoying a bath or a trip, but we cannot speak of
sexual liking or trip liking. Geiger brings this diference to bear on his
account, claiming that «pleasure has sight; enjoyment is blind».16 In
short: pleasure may grasp values, but enjoyment lacks this cognitive
function. 
2.1.5 Contrast cases 
Finally, Geiger adds an observation which can be considered as a
further argument for the separation of the two aesthetic phenomena:
liking and enjoyment can enter into confict. It is possible to notice the
defects of a melody and be displeased by them, yet the melody might
move us emotionally so that we come to enjoy it. We hear something
like “the voice of aesthetic conscience” as Geiger puts it, but through
our emotions we manage to enjoy the melody.
It is worth observing that this distinction between liking and
enjoyment is based on a fundamental distinction between grasping
values and responding to them emotionally. As I have underscored in
the previous exposition, to describe the phenomenon of enjoyment,
Geiger compares enjoyment with other emotional reactions toward the
artwork, such as fear, anger, terror, desperation, and so on. The
category of emotional responses to which enjoyment belongs difers in
a crucial respect from the grasping of values, which he describes as
liking. Only through liking, and not through enjoyment, that we are
able to grasp and afirm its values. 
Like other phenomenologists and many of the heirs to the Brentano
16 GEIGER 1986, 63. 
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school, Geiger is defending value objectivism. He applies this
objectivism to the realm of the aesthetics. In fact, he adapts for the
feld of aesthetics the idea of an original feeling which is responsible
for acquainting us with the sphere of values and is distinct from
merely sensuous feelings and emotions. Among Brentano’s followers,
the idea of an original emotive intentionality appears mainly in two
versions. According to one version, proposed by authors such as the
late Meinong, the feeling of values and emoting are one and the same
phenomenon.17 According to the second version, defended by Reinach
and Scheler, feeling values and emoting are two diferent
phenomena.18 In this phenomenological context, Geiger’s distinction
between liking as a form of grasping values and enjoyment as a form
of responding emotionally to the artwork reproduces in the feld of
aesthetics a broader distinction within early phenomenology between
grasping values – also called value-ception (Wertnehmen in analogy to
per-ception, Wahrnehmen) or value-feeling19 – and responding
emotionally to them.20   
I will come back to this distinction between the grasping of values
and emotional responses in the course of reassessing Geiger’s work,
below. For now, let us note that the distinction between liking and
enjoyment is crucial in supporting Geiger’s distinction between an
aesthetics concerned with the values of the artwork and an aesthetics
concerned primarily with how the work afects us by eliciting
emotional responses. In short, the distinction is crucial for
distinguishing his aesthetics of value from the aesthetics of efects
17 The claim is developed mainly in MEINONG 2020. 
18 REINACH 2017, 109; SCHELER 1973, 197.
19 As SCHELER (1973, 295) demonstrates, feelings can be of many kinds and might include
sensory feelings (e.g., bodily pleasure and pain), vital feelings (e.g., tiredness),
psychological feelings (e.g., disgust, fear), and spiritual feelings (e.g., desperation,
beatitude). When I write here about the feeling of values, I do not refer to any of these
categories of feelings; rather, I employ this term in line with Scheler to describe a sui
generis feeling which make us acquainted with evaluative properties or values.
20 For some proponents of the perceptual model of the emotions, the feeling of values is
itself an emotion. However, there are strong arguments against this view: MULLIGAN
2010, 481; VENDRELL FERRAN 2008, chapter 6. 
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which he considered to be dominant during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. 
Note that this distinction between both kinds of phenomena takes
place at the conceptual level because, as Geiger makes clear, both
forms of engagement with the artwork are intertwined in the aesthetic
experience. In fact, we do not only grasp the values of the work
through liking it, but we also experience enjoyment while engaging
with it. Moreover, genuine aesthetic enjoyment must be based on a
liking of the values of the work. Before turning to a reassessment of
Geiger’s main tenets, an examination of the interaction between
grasping values and genuine aesthetic enjoyment is required. 
2.2 The Distinction Between Pleasure (Lust) and Happiness
(Beglückung) 
The distinction between liking and enjoyment should not be confated
with the distinction between the two kinds of an artwork’s efects on
us which Geiger refers to as surface and depth efects. Examples of
surface efects are “amusement”, “pleasure efects” (when we are
amused by a farce or a joke), feelings evoked by sentimental songs,
delight in the excitement of a melodrama, or the tension felt when
reading an adventure story. By contrast, depth efects afect the person
in his or her totality. 
Geiger examines the diference between both kinds of efects by
focusing on pleasure (Lust) as representative of surface efects, and
happiness (Glück, Beglückung) as an example of a depth efect.21 Note
that the term «pleasure» is employed here to refer to an efect of the
work on us and not, as in the previous section, in terms of an active
liking of the values of the work. Though the distinction between
pleasure and happiness refers to the emotional efects of the artwork,
it presupposes a distinction between liking and enjoyment. As I will
21 The distinction is presented in the second chapter of Zugänge zur Ästhetik (Approaches to
Aesthetics) (GEIGER 1928). This chapter has been translated into English as Surface and
Depth efects of Art in GEIGER 1986. 
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show, happiness, but not pleasure (Lust), is necessarily grounded on
the grasping of the aesthetic values of the work.
That said, let me elaborate the main arguments upon which Geiger
establishes a distinction between surface and depth efects, i.e.,
between pleasure and happiness. The arguments can be summarized
in the following terms. 
2.2.1 Individual event vs. total state 
First, Geiger describes pleasure (in the sense of Lust) as «an individual
event» or «isolated psychic occurrence»22 which does not involve the
whole person. By contrast, happiness is described as a total state of the
self which is invested with pleasure but which cannot be reduced to it.
2.2.2 Surface vs. deep origins
Second, both phenomena have diferent origins. Pleasure arises when
psychic events are favorable for the person. Instead, happiness is a
primary state of the person. As he puts it: «The roots of happiness lie
deeper than those of pleasure».23
2.2.3. Response vs. conscious grasp of values
Third, surface efects such as pleasure might arise from an immediate
stimulus or from attending to an object. By contrast, depth efects such
as happiness are never a mere reaction to a stimulus but demand that
we consciously grasp the artistic values and allow them to afect us.
2.2.4 Vital sphere vs. existential self
Finally, pleasure is a reaction at the level of the vital sphere which is
common to animals and human beings. Examples of pleasure are: «the
excitement and suspense of a game, pleasure in eating, sensuous
voluptuousness, pleasure in the excitement of body and mind».24
Surface efects are related to non-aesthetic efects of the vital sphere,
and can be found outside the arts. By contrast, depth efects reach the
22 GEIGER 1986, 50.
23 GEIGER 1986, 50.
24 GEIGER 1986, 50.
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kernel of the person, mobilize some central aspect of her, afect her
existential self, and may elicit “happiness” (Glück, Beglückung) which
is, for Geiger, central to the aesthetic experience. 
The distinction between the two aspects of the artwork’s efect is
based on a claim often endorsed by objectivist views on value,
according to which values are organized hierarchically. In fact, the
distinction between vital and existential values corresponds to a
distinction between strata in the constitution of the person. While vital
values are common to humans and animals and we react to them with
pleasure, the sphere of artistic values can only be grasped by
mobilizing central aspects of the person. The origins of this idea of a
hierarchy of values and a corresponding stratifcation of the emotional
life can already be found in Scheler, but Geiger applies it to the
aesthetic realm.25 More specifcally, as we have seen, Geiger is here
focusing on two kinds of values – the spheres of vital and existential
values – and the two corresponding strata of the person – the vital self
and the existential self. 
Geiger’s picture can be summarized as follows. Aesthetic values
which are given to us as being phenomenologically objective are
grasped in acts of liking/disliking (Gefallen). Once disclosed, aesthetic
values afect us in both the vital and existential spheres, serving as
sources of pleasure (Lust) – or enjoyment (Genuss), which is a form of
pleasure – and happiness (Beglückung). The main requirement in order
for this to happen is that we adopt an aesthetic attitude of
contemplation and distance between ourselves and the artwork. Only
in this attitude can we grasp the values of the work and become
existentially afected by them.
In my view, the distinction between liking and enjoyment can be
interpreted as a distinction between two kinds of pleasure. There is a
kind of pleasure which Geiger calls liking, which consists in grasping
the values of the work, and another kind – to which enjoyment
25 SCHELER 1973, 295. However, as mentioned in footnote 19, Scheler identifes four layers in
the stratifcation of the emotional life. Each of these layers is linked to a diferent level of
value. 
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belongs – which consists in reacting emotionally to the work. Ortega y
Gasset, inspired by Geiger, spoke insightfully of blind and seeing
pleasures. “Blind pleasures” are caused by something but are unable
to grasp values. By contrast, with “seeing pleasures”, we are happy
about something while being conscious of its value. For Ortega y
Gasset, «aesthetic pleasure must be a seeing pleasure»26 insofar as it
must grasp the values of the work. 
3. Reassessing Geiger’s Account
I have presented Geiger’s main arguments for a distinction between
liking and enjoyment and for the view that liking is revelatory of
values. This section reassesses Geiger’s main tenets in the light of
more recent accounts (I will focus mainly on objectivist accounts, for
which aesthetic pleasure is connected with aesthetic value). More
specifcally, I will address two issues: Can liking be distinguished
from the category of emotion? Is liking a means of revealing the
aesthetic values of the work? 
3.1 Is Liking Distinct from the Emotions?
The frst of Geiger’s claims to be evaluated is the distinction between
liking and enjoyment as a distinction between an active engagement
with the artwork and a passive form of emotional response. In short,
the question is: Is liking diferent from emoting or can liking be
considered a kind of emotion?
In a recent proposal, Reicher has argued that liking (and its opposite,
disliking) is an aesthetic emotion. In her view, aesthetic experiences
are constituted by a perception (or imagining) plus a feeling (Gefühl).
To refer to this feeling component of the aesthetic experience, she
speaks of an «aesthetic emotion» (ästhetisches Gefühl).27 There are two
26 ORTEGA Y GASSEt 2019, 27. For the infuence of Geiger on Ortega y Gasset’s view on
aesthetic appreciation, see ORRINGER 1974, 36 and VENDRELL FERRAN (forthc.).
27 REICHER 2010, 37.
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main aesthetic emotions: when the aesthetic emotion is positive, she
calls it “liking” (Gefallen) and when it is negative, she calls it
“disliking” (Missfallen). Liking as aesthetic emotion is a constitutive
element of the aesthetic experience. 
According to Reicher, aesthetic properties depend on non-aesthetic
ones, i.e., they are founded on or supervene on non-aesthetic
properties.28 She defends a dispositional view of aesthetic properties,
according to which an object has, under ideal conditions, the
disposition to cause an “emotion of beauty” (Schönheitsgefühl). She
employs the idea of “ideal conditions” rather than “normal
conditions” (which is the term usually preferred in dispositionalist
accounts) because the perception of aesthetic properties occasionally
requires ideal conditions, such as attending to the object, being
sensitive to it, having the capacity to discern, etc. Reicher’s
dispositionalist view is in fact a form of value objectivism. In this
account, liking and disliking do not have the function of grasping
values but they are a constitutive part of the aesthetic experience in
which values are grasped. 
I have introduced Reicher’s account here because her proposal to
assimilate liking to the aesthetic emotions is diametrically opposed to
Geiger’s account, according to which liking cannot be explained in
terms of emotional responses. Can we support Geiger’s view? Or
should liking be considered an emotion, as per Reicher’s proposal? I
think that we have good reasons for adopting Geiger’s view. In what
follows, I will introduce arguments which, when combined with
Geiger’s arguments above, compel us to accept the existence of a
fundamental distinction between liking and emoting. In fact, as I will
show, liking does not exhibit the features characteristic of emotional
states. My arguments are as follows: 
3.1.1 Duration vs. occurrence
Emotions (e.g., fear, joy, disgust) have a temporal duration. They
occupy stretches of time. By contrast, liking is something that occurs at
28 REICHER 2010, 61. 
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once. Liking is something that happens, and it can happen again and
again, but it does not endure over time. To say that I like a picture
means that I like this picture each time I see, imagine or think of it.
Thus, liking is something that occurs each time the picture is
presented to my senses or my mind, but it is not a lasting mental
episode.
3.1.2 Heterogeneous development vs. homogeneity
Emotions have a course of development: they begin, evolve, and end.
Emotions are comprised of heterogeneous moments. By contrast,
liking does not have a temporal course of development: it is
homogeneous when it occurs. The claim “I like it” is a claim that
indicates the occurrence of a mental activity which, when it happens,
is homogeneous, but the sentence does not denote a state or a process
which evolves over time.
Both of these arguments are derived from the diferent ways in
which the two phenomena occupy time. They are important
arguments because they enable us to classify emotions and liking as
belonging to two diferent categories of the mind. Phenomena that
have a temporal duration and a course of development in which
diferent moments are involved are mental states and processes, while
phenomena which just occur and do not evolve are mental activities.29
Emotions function like states or processes (which can also exist in
dispositional form), while liking is better understood as a mental
activity.30 Mental activities cannot be reduced to mental states or
processes. It would therefore be a mistake to interpret liking, a mental
activity, in terms of emotion, which belongs to another category of the
29 In my view, the main arguments for the distinction between mental activities and mental
states can be found in early phenomenology. Although Reinach uses a diferent
terminology from the one that I employ here, he makes a similar distinction between
mental acts and mental conditions (REINACH 2017, 211). Scheler develops a tripartite
model and distinguishes between acts, functions, and states of the mind (SCHELER 1973,
257). 
30 Liking is not a disposition which can be activated because liking does not involve a story
comprising events. However, liking can be grounded on certain dispositions and skills.
For a characterization of mental activities, see WOLLHEIM 1984, 35. 
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mind. Both arguments speak in favor of Geiger’s distinction. 
Before turning to the characterization of liking as a kind of mental
activity, it is necessary to present some further arguments for
distinguishing liking from the category of emotion. These arguments
are derived from diferences in how emotions and liking relate to
values.
3.1.3 Formal objects 
Emotions have material objects and formal objects. Fear of a dog is
directed toward the dog (the material object) and to the property of
danger that is instantiated by the dog (the formal object, also called the
evaluative property or value). Each emotion has its characteristic
formal object or objects. Fear and disgust are associated with the
dangerous and the disgusting. Other emotions might be directed
toward a wider range of formal objects (admiration can be an
emotional response to beauty, elegance, generosity, etc.). But what is
the formal object of liking? The answer is that the formal object of
liking includes the whole class of positive aesthetic values. The
diference between the emotions and liking can be put as follows: the
formal objects of the emotions are more determinate than the formal
objects of liking, which target a whole class of values.  
3.1.4 Appropriateness
There is a further diference related to this. Emotions can be either
appropriate or inappropriate in regard to their formal objects. Fear is
appropriate if the material object toward which it is directed
instantiates the formal object (or evaluative property or value) of
danger, but inappropriate if the object is disgusting rather than
dangerous. However, liking is appropriate insofar as the liked object
has a positive aesthetic value. Thus, for liking to be appropriate it is
not necessary that what we like instantiates a specifc formal object.
The value instantiated must simply belong to the class of positive
aesthetic values.
The last two arguments suggest that liking behaves diferently from
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the emotions in terms of its relation to values. These diferences
neither confrm nor disprove Geiger’s second claim (that liking allows
us to grasp aesthetic values), but simply reveal that liking and the
emotions have diferent relations to values. I will examine this point in
the next section. For now, however, it is important to point out that
these arguments show that liking is directed toward the whole realm
of the positive aesthetic values, while each emotion has specifc formal
objects (though the particular way in which liking is directed toward
values must be examined in more detail). In this respect, too, these
arguments support Geiger’s view for a distinction between liking and
the emotions. 
Additionally, let me note that Geiger’s account is better equipped to
explain the relation between liking and the emotional responses.
Consider the following case. We can like an aesthetically valuable
object and while the liking remains the same, we can experience
several diferent emotions toward it. For instance, if something is
aesthetically beautiful and we like it, we can also experience a wide
range of emotional responses toward it, such as delight, joy, etc.
Reicher understands liking as an aesthetic emotion constitutive of the
aesthetic experience, but she does not explain how constitutive
aesthetic emotions such as liking and disliking relate to those aesthetic
emotions that we only occasionally experience. By contrast, Geiger’s
account proposes a kind of division of labor: in liking we grasp the
values of the work, while in emotion we respond to it. 
In summary, the four arguments that I have introduced in this
section make the case for distinguishing liking from the emotional
responses. As I have shown, liking is a mental activity and as such
cannot be explained in terms of an emotional response, which is rather
a state or a process. In a nutshell, we have good reasons to accept
Geiger’s frst tenet – that liking is not an emotion.
3.2 Does Liking Reveal Aesthetic Value? 
Let us turn to Geiger’s second tenet – that liking reveals aesthetic
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value. Can we fnd support for this claim too? As we have seen, liking
behaves diferently from the emotions regarding values, but does this
diference imply that liking reveals aesthetic value? 
To gain a more precise insight into Geiger’s account, let me compare
it with Gorodeisky’s more recent proposal, which was mentioned in
my introduction. According to Gorodeisky’s account, aesthetic
pleasure or – as she calls it – liking is the response that aesthetically
valuable objects merit. In her view, liking is able to reveal the values of
the work. As she puts it: «artworks that are valuable qua artworks
merit, deserve, and call for a certain pleasure the same pleasure that
reveals (or purports to reveal) them to be valuable in the way that they
are, and constitutes their aesthetic evaluation».31 
As with Geiger, Gorodeisky’s view aims at reconciling the
objectivity of values with the subjective character of the aesthetic
experience and, interestingly, she also places her account in line with
the Brentanian tradition of value.32 For her, aesthetic value is
metaphysically mind-independent, i.e., it is neither a feeling nor the
31 GORODEISKY 2019b, 2.
32 GORODEISKY 2019a, footnotes 3 and 4. However, Gorodeisky also considers herself to be
embedded in the Kantian tradition. Geiger sometimes also includes Kant as part of a
tradition that attributes a cognitive function for aesthetic value to the feelings. However,
there are important diferences in how Geiger and Gorodeisky relate to Kant. In his
posthumously published Aesthetischer Absolutismus (Aesthetic Absolutism), Geiger
describes Kant’s aesthetic judgment as a judgment about our pleasure, but not as a
judgment about a property of the object (GEIGER 1976, 368-69). The judgments “this table
is round” and “this painting is beautiful” are, at frst glance, similar, but the former is a
judgment about a property of the table while the latter signifes that the painting is an
object of my pleasure. For Geiger, Kant’s aesthetic judgment is a “judgment of
refection”, i.e., a judgment about an emotional response and as such it is subjective and
individual. However, Kant formulates it as if it were a universal judgment. As a result,
Kant’s view entails a paradox for Geiger: a judgment based on a subjective emotional
reaction is taken to be universal. Contrary to this view, Geiger stresses that an aesthetic
judgment cannot be based on an emotional response (such as enjoyment), rather it must
be based on the act of disclosing values, which he calls liking. In fact, a recurrent critique
of Kant in Geiger’s works is that Kant does not acknowledge the existence of an
immediate grasping of values (GEIGER 1986, 190). For Geiger, to claim that an aesthetic
judgment is based on an emotional response is to leave the door open to aesthetic
relativism, which stands in opposition to his project of developing an objectivist
aesthetic value.
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projection of a feeling onto an object, though it cannot be characterized
independently of our capacity to feel it. Unlike dispositionalist
accounts, which claim that “under standard conditions” aesthetic
values are experienced with pleasure, Gorodiesky thinks that it is
possible for us to fail to feel pleasure toward an aesthetically valuable
object even under normal conditions.33 Thus, she conceives of the
relation between aesthetic value and liking in terms of a “merited
response” and attributes the ability to reveal values to liking. 
Gorodeisky characterizes liking in terms of its structure and its
function in modifying certain experiences. Liking is described not as a
“separate occurrent state”, but as a way of engaging with an object by,
for instance, perceiving, imagining, attending or evaluating it.34 She
claims that the kind of pleasure she is describing is not a sensation, but
a kind of activity which has a receptive function of being open to the
world.35 She characterizes it as a feeling36 and argues that we feel
pleasure in a work in light of enjoying something about it (its grace,
etc.). In short, Gorodeisky argues that we grasp the value of the object
by enjoying it. As she puts it: «aesthetic pleasure makes the object’s
value available to the feeling subject by modifying experiences such as
perceiving, imagining, and attending».37 
However, there are signifcant diferences with Geiger. In
Gorodeisky’s account, although liking is described in terms of a
feeling, its diference from the emotions is, on certain occasions, less
distinct. This becomes evident through the vocabulary used by
33 We can also fail to like aesthetically valuable objects under ideal conditions. 
34 GORODEISKY 2019a, 9.
35 Drawing on Ryle, GORODEISKY (2019b, 6) observes that one of the reasons why pleasure
cannot be classifed as a sensation is that it is not subject to spatial and temporal
measurements. She rightly indicates the active character of pleasure (in contrast to
passive sensations). However, I think that this should be taken as an indicator that
pleasure (in the sense of liking) belongs to a diferent category of the mind – the category
of activities – and as such it is diferent not only from the sensations but also from the
emotional states (which, unlike sensations, cannot be spatially located but, like
sensations and unlike activities, have a temporal development).  
36 GORODEISKY 2019b, 13f. She characterizes liking as a response in terms of a feeling;
sometimes she describes this feeling in terms close to the emotions. 
37 GORODEISKY 2019a, 10.
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Gorodeisky, who writes of liking in terms of a merited response which
has at the same time an ability to reveal values. In contrast, Geiger is
careful to diferentiate between the disclosure of values and emotional
responses. He never describes liking in terms of responding, but in
terms of grasping the values of the work. In my view, grasping the
work’s values is a kind of cognitive experience whereby we gain
access to the sphere of values. Once we a have a cognition of value,
i.e., once we grasp it, this value can demand that we respond to it with
an emotion, but the cognition of value is not a response to the values,
but a form of being receptive to them.38 The concepts of demand and
response imply that we have already gained access to the value in
question. Below I consider the notions of receptiveness and
responsiveness separately, since they constitute two diferent
moments of the aesthetic experience. 
Second, and related to this last point, Gorodeisky claims that liking
is self-maintaining in the sense that it tends toward its own
continuation «such that one typically wishes to, and tends to, retain
the same pleasurable experience».39 However, liking cannot be self-
maintaining in the sense that we want it to continue over time. What
we desire to continue is enjoyment, i.e., the pleasant emotional state or
process. Liking just happens and does not have continuity in time. We
can desire to like an object again and again, but liking is an occurrence
which does not develop over time. In short, I think – as Geiger does –
that liking should be interpreted in terms of a mental occurrence or –
as I put it – in terms of a mental activity distinct from the emotional
responses. 
That said, let us subject Geiger’s view that liking reveals the work’s
aesthetic values to further scrutiny. Does liking grasp the aesthetic
values of the work? Although I agree with Geiger’s claim that liking is
an occurrence, i.e., in my terms a mental activity, I think that we
38 I take the concepts of responsivity and receptivity from Scheler. When Scheler claims
that values demand emotional responses, he clearly distinguishes the cognitive moment
of grasping values (value-feeling or value-ception) from the emotional response to the
felt value (SCHELER 1973, 255). 
39 SCHELER 1973, 255.
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should reject his interpretation of liking in terms of a form of grasping
values. In short, I think that liking and grasping values are diferent
kinds of mental activities. My view is based on the following two
arguments: 
3.2.1 Grasping without liking
First, we can disclose an aesthetic value without liking or disliking it.
That is, we can become immediately acquainted with the aesthetic
value of an object without experiencing any like or dislike. I might see
that a picture is sublime, but it can happen that I neither like nor
dislike it. Thus, it is possible to disclose aesthetic values through a
feeling and to do so without the presence of likes or dislikes.
3.2.2 Appropriateness and lack thereof  
Second, to grasp an aesthetic value is neither appropriate nor
inappropriate, while likes and dislikes are subject to conditions of
appropriateness. As I mentioned above, liking is appropriate when a
positive aesthetic value is given, while disliking is appropriate in the
presence of a negative aesthetic disvalue. The grasping of an aesthetic
value is something that is outside the parameters of appropriateness.40
However, in order to like a value, the value must be given to us as
belonging to the class of positive aesthetic values. 
Both arguments speak for the untenability of Geiger’s second claim
(that liking grasps the values of the work). The fact is that liking – as
indicated by Geiger and more recently by Gorodeisky – is related to
aesthetic value, but liking and grasping the values of the work are not
the same.  
4. On Value-Feeling, Liking, and Emoting
In the previous sections, I presented Geiger’s account of two kinds of
aesthetic pleasure: liking and enjoyment. I argued that we have good
40 Mulligan develops this claim for the grasping of values more generally: MULLIGAN 2010,
481.
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reasons to accept Geiger’s frst tenet – that liking does not belong to
the class of the emotional responses – but I also argued that we should
reject his second tenet, according to which liking grasps aesthetic
values. Let us return to the two questions with which I opened this
paper: What is the place of aesthetic pleasure or liking within the
mind? How is aesthetic pleasure or liking connected to values? In this
last section, I will provide an answer to these questions which, despite
being inspired by Geiger’s account, diverges from it with respect to
the cognitive function of liking. My suggestion is that liking is a type
of feeling motivated by the cognition of aesthetic value. This kind of
feeling should be distinguished from the category of value-feelings,
which are the most primary form of engagement with the world, and
from the category of emotional responses. 
The primary function at work in disclosing the evaluative dimension
of life is the phenomenon that, in accordance with the
phenomenological tradition, I have referred to as feeling of values
(sometimes also called value-ception or value-feeling). Value-feeling is
a primary mental activity which grasps or discloses values. It is a
specifc and originary form of receptivity toward the world. Value-
feeling is also at work when we engage with works of art. Here, too,
we grasp and disclose the values embodied in the work. Some of these
values are non-aesthetic, for instance, when we feel values of courage
or injustice depicted in the narrative. Other values are of an aesthetic
nature, such as feeling the sadness of a melody or the beauty or
elegance of a dance (these values often supervene on non-aesthetic
elements of the work). The activity of the mind at work in all these
examples of disclosure of value is a feeling of value, value-ception or
value-feeling. In some cases, this activity might require that we have
developed particular skills and that we have been trained to feel
certain complex values. 
This feeling of aesthetic values is only one initial moment of the
more complex phenomenon that we call aesthetic experience. The
value-feeling is a frst moment of receptivity toward the values of the
work: it is a moment characterized by the cognition of value. A second
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moment of responsivity toward these grasped values might take place.
Responsivity requires that we have already been acquainted with the
values of the work. In my view, there are diferent forms in which we
might be responsive toward the values of the work. On the one hand,
the values grasped might motivate further mental activities which
have the form of specifc feelings, such as liking, being moved, being
edifed, etc. On the other hand, they might motivate mental states or
processes, such as the emotional responses of enjoyment, terror, fear,
etc.41 
According to the view that I am proposing here, liking is a mental
activity necessarily based and founded on an initial and more
originary mental activity: the feeling of values. Liking is one of the
possible feelings motivated by the originary feeling of values but
liking is not itself an originary value-feeling, despite being a feeling.42
According to the picture that I am proposing here, the aesthetic
experience is a heterogeneous complex constituted by diferent
moments, two of which are the grasping of value and the liking of it.43
The frst of these feelings is original and primitive and it is the feeling
of being receptive to the work’s values. The second feeling requires
the frst in order to take place and it is the feeling of responding to the
work and its positive aesthetic values. Both kinds of feeling – the
primary and receptive feeling of values and the secondary and
responsive liking of values – are activities of the mind. Liking is a
responsive feeling toward a grasped aesthetic value. In fact, the
41 This tripartite distinction can be found in von HILDEBRAND 2016, 368. He identifes three
phenomena: apprehending values, being afected by them (e.g., being moved, stirred,
lifted up or edifed), and emotional responses (e.g., enthusiasm). However, von
Hildebrand aims to show that liking is not an important category for aesthetics and
connects it with modest aesthetic values. 
42 Von Hildebrand distinguishes between the two moments in terms of a seeing of values
and a feeling of values. However, in my view, the seeing of values is already a feeling
because apprehending a value moves and afects us. Thus, I prefer to speak of two
feelings: one original and more primitive feeling of the value of the work and a second
feeling grounded on the frst which adopts a more specifc form and consists in liking
the values grasped.  
43 I take inspiration here from Hartmann, for whom aesthetic pleasure is the subjective
reverse of the intuition of aesthetic value (HARMAN 2014, 16-17 and 74). 
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grasping of an aesthetic value can motivate us to like it. None of these
moments should be confated with the emotions, which are responses
to artworks, and have both temporal development and specifc formal
objects. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I ofered an analysis of aesthetic pleasure within the
framework of an aesthetics of value. In the frst part, I presented
Geiger’s distinction between two kinds of pleasure – liking and
enjoyment – and I showed that, for him, only liking fulflls the
cognitive function of grasping the values of a work. In the second part,
I examined Geiger’s main tenets, establishing a comparison between
his views and more recent accounts. I provided arguments in favor of
Geiger’s frst tenet – which distinguishes liking from the emotional
responses – but I challenged his second tenet, that liking is able to
grasp values. Finally, I suggested a distinction between two kinds of
feelings: the originary feeling of values, which is receptive to the
values of the work, and the secondary feeling of liking, which is a
form of response to the aesthetic values grasped. According to the
view proposed, liking is a form of feeling motivated by the cognition
of aesthetic value.  
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